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Flexible versus Simple Trade-in Strategy for Remanufacturing

Abstract: Some enterprises recently start to offer the flexible trade-in option to attract customers
from competitors, in contrast to the simple one that only allows them to return used products to
the same manufacturers for new. Based on analytical and numerical analyses, this study compares
the environmental impacts of two trade-in strategies (simple versus flexible) in combination with
different carbon tax policies. From the perspective of consumer switching behavior, a Hotelling
model with two market segments is established. Under the flexible trade-in strategy, the carbon
emission of enterprises turns out to be significantly higher than that under the simple trade-in
strategy. An appropriate carbon tax policy, especially with preferential tax rates on green products,
is capable of guiding enterprises to choose a more environment-friendly trade-in strategy included
in the model. The findings fill the research gap in comparing the pros and cons of simple and
flexible trade-in strategies in terms of sustainable development, and provide managers and policymakers the insights on how to promote the healthy development of the remanufacturing industry
with trade-in strategizing and carbon taxation.
Keywords: remanufacturing; trade-in strategy; Hotelling model; market segment; carbon tax.
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1. Introduction
With the aggravation of global warming and environmental issues, green economy and
sustainable development are becoming the consensus of people around the world. In operations
and production management, more and more enterprises pay close attention to corporate
sustainability and social responsibility (Walker, Klassen, Sarkis et al., 2014). As one effective
means, remanufacturing is distinct from traditional manufacturing in that the raw materials come
from used products. Rather than dumping them, enterprises disassemble used products and recover
the parts that can be processed for new products (Ferrer & Swaminathan, 2006). Through the reuse
of raw materials and parts, manufacturers effectively cut greenhouse gas emission (Chen & Chang,
2012; Savaskan, Bhattacharya, & van Wassenhove, 2004).
As a sustainable development endeavor, remanufacturing is supported by governments all
over the world. For example, the EU's End-of-life Vehicles (ELVs) Directive and Electronic
Equipment Directive came into effect in 2000 and 2003, respectively (Mazzanti & Zoboli, 2006).
Maryland and Californian in the United States passed legislations to impose electronic waste
recycling fees (Equalization, 2018). Canada and Japan are the two countries that first subsidized
the remanufacturing industry (Hicks, Dietmar, & Eugster, 2005). In 2008, China's National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) initiated 14 pilot projects to support the
remanufacturing of auto parts (Wang, Chang, Chen et al., 2014).
One of the major challenges facing the remanufacturing industry today is the acquisition of
used products, for which trade-in is indispensable (Gu & Tagaras, 2014; Wang, Chang, Chen et al.,
2014). In 2009, the Chinese government introduced a trade-in subsidy to help the remanufacturing
industry get more used products from customers. This allows the firms in question to offer
consumers incentives in form of rebates or discounts when they return used products for new
(especially appliances). Such transactions provide a win-win solution: they save consumers money,
give remanufacturers “raw” materials, and promote the sales of newer-generation products (Liu,
Zhai, & Chen, 2019).
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Smartphones emerge as fast-upgrading consumer electronics, and manufacturers around the
world offer all kinds of trade-in programs. Mainly for its iPhones, Apple first launched the first
Reuse and Recycling Program in February 2016. When other firms like Samsung and Huawei
offered similar options, Apple further allowed consumers to return used smartphones of other
brands for its latest products1. Compared with the original practice, this flexible strategy helps
Apple attract consumers from its rivals. To get their market shares back, of course, competitors
soon implemented similar programs.
The extant research only considers a single manufacturer with the simple trade-in strategy to
recycle its own products (Cao, Bo, & He, 2018; Huang, 2018). Whereas the findings provide
helpful insights, they are limited due to the fact that multiple manufacturers in the same arena tend
to pursue the flexible trade-in strategy instead. It is still unclear which trade-in strategy, simple or
flexible, puts the whole remanufacturing industry in a better position for sustainable development
from both environmental and financial aspects. In addition to the trade-in subsidy as the positive
incentive for remanufacturing, countries like Finland, Norway, Japan and Mexico impose carbon
tax as a negative incentive on all enterprises to reduce green-house gas emission (Carl & Fedor,
2016; Haites, 2018). Therefore, this study develops various Hotelling models to compare the two
trade-in strategies in the context of carbon taxation. The results of numerical analyses yield a more
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon and useful insights for the healthier
development of the remanufacturing industry.
The remainder of this article is organized as below. First, it lays out the research background
on remanufacturing and trade-in, carbon tax, and Hotelling model. Then, it describes model
development and equilibrium analysis. The modeling enables the comparison between simple and
flexible trade-in strategies under different carbon tax settings. The findings are discussed in terms
and theoretical and practical implications, followed by the conclusion.

1

https://www.apple.com.cn/shop/trade-in
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2. Research Background
2.1 Remanufacturing and trade-in
As a practice of collecting used products and processing them to the condition like new
(Ovchinnikov, Blass, & Raz, 2014), remanufacturing is an innovative business strategy that
combines elements of marketing (Atasu, Sarvary, & Wassenhove, 2008) and environment
protection (Govindan, Parra, Rubio et al., 2019). For enterprises to strengthen competitive
advantage, researchers consider the differentiation of utility and price of remanufactured goods
from the new (Ferrer, 2010), production planning and product pricing under monopoly and
duopoly situations (Ferrer & Swaminathan, 2006), various supply chain leaders (Choi, Li, & Xu,
2013), and multiple cycles (Ferguson & Toktay, 2010). Remanufacturing may create new
opportunities for enterprises, but they face various challenges especially the low recycling rate
(Ferguson & Toktay, 2010).
To encourage consumers to return used products, the remanufacturing industry implements
all kinds of trade-in programs. Initially, the simple trade-in strategy enables manufacturers to
recycle their own products, which then ushers in the flexible strategy that allows consumers to
return competitors’ products. Remanufacturers make different levels of profits from refurbishing,
repairing and reprocessing used products. Table 1 reports the rebate amounts offered by the tradein programs, which vary across program hosts and product brands, of four major smartphone
manufacturers.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Though many enterprises implement flexible trade-in programs for certain products, simple
trade-in programs are still common. Except for smartphones, for instance, Apple gives no rebate
to consumers when they return other brands of PCs or smartwatches to its Reuse and Recycling
Program. Its competitors in the PC industry, Dell and Lenovo, adopt the flexible trade-in strategy
in contrast. In the printer industry, HP launched a flexible trade-in program to recycle qualified
4

non-HP laser and inkjet printers2, but Canon only implemented the simple trade-in program for its
own products3. Similarly, many enterprises in different industries face a choice between simple
and flexible trade-in strategies.
A manufacturer may pursue flexible trade-in to increase its market share. However, is the
whole industry better off if all competitors switch to flexible trade-in or hold on to simple tradein? This study attempts to answer this question with the game theory approach considering all
stakeholders, including manufacturers, consumers, and government.
2.2 Hotelling model
In the closed-loop supply chain context, researchers consider all kinds of competitions
between two entities, such as new and used products (Liu, Zhai, & Chen, 2019), OEM- and remanufacturers (Dou, Guo, Zhang et al., 2019), platform-run and third-party sellers (Cao, Xu, Bian
et al., 2019), regular and trade-in retailers (Huang, 2018), and regular and direct (i.e., manufacturer)
retailers (Saha, Sarmah, & Moon, 2016). However, few have examined the competition between
two firms that produce both new and remanufactured products.
The Hotelling model (Hotelling, 1990) is capable of modeling the game between two
competitors (Chen & Liu, 2014; Chen & Sheu, 2013). It has been used to model the competition
between OEM- and re-manufacturers (Pazoki & Zacciyr, 2019; Wu, 2013), retailer and e-tailer
(He, Xiong, & Lin, 2016), and regular and direct (i.e., manufacturer) retailers (Ofek, Katona, &
Sarvary, 2011). This study uses the Hotelling model to simulate the competition between two firms
with remanufacturing capacity.
For optimizing trade-in programs in terms of corporate profitability, researchers consider
pricing strategy (Liu, Zhai, & Chen, 2019), channel selection (Feng, Li, Xu et al., 2019); (Cao,
Wang, Duo et al., 2018), recycler choice (Cao, Bo, & He, 2018; Miao, Fu, Xia et al., 2017), rebate

2
3

Source: https://h41201.www4.hp.com/WMCF.Web/us/en/landing/portal/trade-in/
Source: http://www.canon.com.cn/support/announce/products/5747.html
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mechanism design (Cao, Xu, Bian et al., 2019; Ray, Boyaci, & Aras, 2011), and product
upgrading/updating (Liu, Zhai, & Chen, 2019; Yin & Tang, 2014). Customer purchasing behavior
is also examined for the economic valuation of remanufacturing efficiency (Zhang & Zhang, 2018).
These studies address how different trade-in configurations affect the decision-making and
profitability of manufacturers. Yet few have investigated the situation in which two competitors
engage in trade-in activities simultaneously with the same or different strategies (i.e., simple vs.
flexible).
To capture different types of consumers, the modeling may incorporate market segmentation.
Feng, Li, Xu et al. (2019) explored the firms’ optimal trade-in policies in a competitive
environment based on two market segments: new consumers and regular consumers. Furthermore,
this study compares different trade-in strategies by establishing a Hotelling model considering the
market segmentation based on the ownership of different brands of used products.
2.3 Carbon tax
In addition to the market competition, remanufacturers need to consider environment-related
government policy in strategizing trade-in. To control and reduce total green-house gas from
production, policy-makers impose the cost of emission on manufacturers with carbon tax and capand-trade (Barragán-Beaud, Pizarro-Alonso, Xylia et al., 2018). Though both mechanisms are
devised to price CO2 emission, carbon tax exerts a more direct intervention over the total amount
of emission, whereas cap-and-trade largely relies on market control (Chai, Xiao, Lai et al., 2018;
Wittneben, 2009). For illustrative purposes, this study focuses on carbon tax as an exemplary
government policy to examine how the regulatory factor impacts corporate decision-making
regarding remanufacturing and trade-in.
While trade-in subsidy is only for remanufacturing, carbon tax applies to all production (Cao,
He, & Liu, 2019). Thus carbon tax strikes a balance between environment protection and economic
development at a larger scale (Yang, Liu, Ji et al., 2016). When the remanufacturing rate is still
6

relatively low compared with regular production, carbon tax helps reduce the total emission more
quickly than other policies (Zhu, Ren, Chu et al., 2019). On the consumer side, levying carbon tax
at a reasonable level shifts the demand from brand new products to remanufactured ones due to
price differentiation (Pazoki & Zacciyr, 2019).
Like most enterprises, the two manufacturers in the Hotelling model of this study make both
brand new and remanufactured products. Widely used in the real world, carbon tax motivates
enterprises to engage in remanufacturing for emission reduction (Cao, He, & Liu, 2019). Therefore,
carbon tax is incorporated in modeling to see how it affects corporate decision-making regarding
trade-in. In particular, simple and flexible trade-in strategies are distinct in their means (high vs.
low degrees of remanufacturing) and ends (to upgrade/update products for existing customers vs.
to attract new customers). The two strategies have different implications for the fulfillment of
environmental responsibility imposed by carbon tax.
As a cleaner production approach, remanufacturing yields less environmental impacts than
regular production. Carbon tax, often seen as an effective climate policy, encourages enterprises
to pursue remanufacturing for financial benefits. Improving the first-period tax price always
reduces the total emission, but improving the second-period tax price may increase the total
emission (Dou, Guo, Zhang et al., 2019). A well-designed carbon tax promotes remanufacturing
from both economic and environmental aspects. This study examines how carbon tax affects tradein program implementation, especially the choice between simple and flexible strategies, for
optimal industrywide outcomes.

3. Basic Model
3.1 Trade-in and Remanufacturing
There are two enterprises: enterprise i and enterprise s in a competitive relationship, and they
make products in the same line but somewhat differentiated (e.g., smartphones of different
operating systems). The two enterprises make brand new products as well as remanufactured ones.
7

Based on the conditions of used products collected from consumers, an enterprise may choose to
refurbish, repair or reprocess each. To encourage consumers to recycle the used products, both
enterprises implement trade-in programs that allow them to buy new products at discount prices.
In theory, each enterprise has three trade-in options: none, simple and flexible. They lead to
the six combinations between two enterprises as shown in Table 2. Take a smartphone
manufacturer, for instance, it may choose not to recycle used products at all. Environmentunfriendly, such a strategy is weak at retaining existing customers as well. Once one enterprise
allows customers to trade in used products for new, the other will almost certainly follow suit or
lost a significant proportion of market share. Thus, Combinations e and f are unstable, and this
study focuses on Combinations a-d. Combination a represents the baseline scenario in which the
whole industry does not engage in remanufacturing through trade-in. In Combination b, both
enterprises only recycle the used products made by themselves. Combination c is mixed in which
one enterprise implements a flexible trade-in program while the other sticks to the simple one. In
Combination d, both pursue the flexible trade-in strategy to attract customers from competitors.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Enterprises give consumers discounts in various forms (e.g., price reduction, cash, gift card)
when they trade in used products for new ones. The discount amount may vary depending on the
condition of each used product. Before actual transactions, however, enterprises do not know
product conditions, nor are consumers aware of valuation criteria. They can only use the average
value for estimation, which can be found on the Internet for well-known products. In this study,
the average amount of trade-in discount is denoted as 𝑣𝑗𝑗 . In addition, consumers may save
furthermore by purchasing cheaper remanufactured products, of which the quality is a little bit
lower than brand new ones but still acceptable.
Assumption 1. New products and remanufactured products are of different qualities and prices.
Assumption 2. Enterprises give the same total discount to consumers for the same model of used
product.
8

Consuming fewer resources than regular production, remanufacturing always benefits
enterprises financially (Zhu, Ren, Chu et al., 2019). Of course, used products are not of the same
conditions, leading to different salvage values. In this study, the average salvage value is denoted
as 𝑏𝑗𝑗 . Through simple trade-in, an enterprise collects the used products made by itself and directly
works on them. Apple, for instance, turns old iPhones into certified refurbished products. Through
flexible trade-in, an enterprise collects used products of its competitors but may contract thirdparty resellers to make uncertified refurbished products. As certified products are pricier than
uncertified ones, remanufacturing yields different profit margins for simple and flexible trade-in
programs.
3.2 Consumer Behavior and Trade-in
Strategic consumers are considered in this study: each evaluates the utilities of purchase
options and chooses the one of the maximum utility. When a consumer decides to buy a new
product from enterprise j, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑠}, the individual has two options: trading in old for new or
regular purchase. Figure 1 shows the four buying options and the corresponding utilities to
consumers. Each consumer’s demand for a new product in one cycle is a constant, and an
individual only uses one product at a time. Once consumers buy new products, their used products
have little value to them (i.e., value = 0).
Assumption 3. Each consumer has one used product, which is of no value to the person after
buying a new product.
Presented the trade-in opportunity offered by enterprise j, consumers who decide to purchase
its new products are likely to recycle used ones for discounts. As shown in Figure 1, the value of
used products to consumers is 0 if not recycled at the purchase of new products. Consumers’ utility
derived from buying new products made by enterprise j is denoted as 𝑢𝑗 , the price of new products
made by enterprise j denoted as Pj , the total trade-in discount from enterprise j denoted as 𝑣𝑗𝑗
and mismatch cost denoted as 𝑡𝑥 or 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) for the consumer located at x.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
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To consumers, purchasing the products without recycling used products is always inferior to
the trade-in options offered by enterprises i and s. Strategic consumers will exclude the undesirable
option first, and choose among the rest to maximize the utility. Depending on whether each
enterprise implements a simple or flexible trade-in program, consumers may make different
purchase decisions for the pursuit of maximum utility.
3.3 The Basic Model-a
Enterprises i and s manufacture horizontally differentiated products, to which consumers have
different preferences. A standard Hotelling setup is used to model the market competition between
two enterprises. We assume enterprise i and enterprise s to be respectively situated at locations 0
and 1 on a line of length 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the line, each owning the
product made by either enterprise.
Table 3 lists the notations in mathematical modeling. The utility a consumer derives, denoted
as 𝑈𝑗 , is affected by product price 𝑃𝑗 , product utility 𝑢𝑗 , and disutility from the productpreference mismatch. The closer consumers are to the Hotelling line, the less mismatch between
their preferences and the products in question.
[Insert Table 3 here]
As shown in Figure 2, the utility for a consumer located at x from each product can be
formulated as
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖 ,

(1)

𝑈𝑠 = 𝑢𝑠 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑃𝑠 ,

(2)

where 𝑢𝑗 is the value derived from the new product, and tx represents the mismatch cost. A
consumer located at x will compare 𝑈𝑖 and 𝑈𝑠 . If 𝑈𝑖 > 𝑈𝑠 , the consumer will choose enterprise
i to maximize the utility. The profit function of the two enterprises can be formulated as
𝜋𝑗 = (𝑃𝑗 − 𝐶𝑗 )𝑞𝑗 ,

(3)

where 𝑗 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑠}, 𝐶𝑗 is the cost of enterprises j manufacturing a new product and 𝑞𝑗 the numbers
of consumers who purchase products from enterprise j. As in the standard setup, by letting 𝑈𝑖 =
10

𝑈𝑠 , the indifferent consumer’s location can be defined as 𝑥 𝑎 =

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑆 )+𝑡
2𝑡

.

[Insert Figure 2 here]
Consumers whose mismatch with enterprise i is smaller than that of indifferent consumers
choose enterprise i’s products and the rest choose enterprise s’. The profit function of the two
enterprises can be specified as
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 )𝑥 𝑎 ,

(4)

𝜋𝑠 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 )(1 − 𝑥 𝑎 ).

(5)

4. Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, three cases of enterprises’ trade-in strategies are discussed, in which the market
is segmented into two by competing enterprises. For each enterprise, the consumers who own its
products comprise the loyal market segment, and consumers who own the competitor’s product
comprise the new market segment. Interestingly, the loyal market segment of enterprise i is also
the new market segment of enterprise s. Then the whole market can be divided into two parts, the
loyal market segments for enterprises i and s, respectively, denoted as market segments 1 and 2.
The size of market segment 1 in terms of the number of consumers is 𝛼 , and that of market
segment 2 is 1 − 𝛼.
In Case 1, each enterprise adopts the simple trade-in strategy. It is replaced by both enterprises
with the flexible strategy in Case 2. Case 3 features a mixture of simple and flexible trade-in
options offered by two competitors to consumers.
4.1 Case 1
In Case 1, only consumers who own used products made by enterprise j can trade them in for
its new products. Figure 3 integrates the Hotelling lines corresponding to two market segments:
each enterprise offers the simple trade-in opportunity to its loyal market segment consumers with
a particular price-utility combination for upgrading to new products.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
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In market segment 1 where people own used products made by enterprise i, consumers can
participate in its trade-in program, or purchase enterprise s’ products. Similarly, in market
segment 2 where people own used products made by enterprise s, consumers can upgrade to its
new products, or purchase enterprise i’s products. The utilities consumers derive from purchasing
without trade-in are shown in eq. (1) and (2). When consumers make purchases through trade-in,
the utilities change. For consumers in market segment 1, the utility they derive from trade-in with
enterprise i can be reformulated as
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖 .

(6)

For consumers in market segment 2, the utility they derive from trade-in with enterprise s can
be reformulated as
𝑈𝑠 = 𝑢𝑠 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑃𝑠 + 𝑣𝑠𝑠 .

(7)

By letting 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑠 in both market segment, indifferent consumer’s locations in two market
segments can be defined as 𝑥1𝑏 =

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖
2𝑡

and 𝑥2𝑏 =

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡−𝑣𝑠𝑠
2𝑡

. In market

segment 1, consumers whose mismatch with enterprise i is smaller than that of indifferent
consumers in segment 1 will choose enterprise i, and the rest choose enterprise s. In market
segment 2, the situation is similar.
In Case 1, two enterprises still pursue the maximal profit. Considering the total discount and
the changed sales, the enterprises’ profit function can be reformulated as
𝜋𝑖𝑏 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )𝛼𝑥1𝑏 + (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 )(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2𝑏 ,

(8)

𝜋𝑠𝑏 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 )𝛼(1 − 𝑥1𝑏 ) + (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2𝑏 ).

(9)

Solving the first-order conditions for the two profit-maximizing enterprises yields the
equilibrium prices, total discount, profits, and sales, as summarized by Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. When both enterprises take a simple trade-in strategy, the equilibrium prices are
𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠
,
3
𝐾3 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖
= 𝐶𝑠 +
,
3

𝑃𝑖𝑏∗ = 𝐶𝑖 +
𝑃𝑠𝑏∗
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the equilibrium sales are
𝑞𝑖𝑏∗ =

𝐾2 + 𝛼𝑏𝑖𝑖 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑏𝑠𝑠
,
6𝑡
𝑞𝑠𝑏∗ = 1 − 𝑞𝑖𝑏∗ ,

the equilibrium total trade-in discounts are
2𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠
,
3
2𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖
=
,
3

𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑏∗ =
𝑏∗
𝑣𝑠𝑠

and the equilibrium profits are
𝛼(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )2
,
18𝑡
𝛼(𝐾3 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾3 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )2
=
,
18𝑡

𝜋𝑖𝑏∗ =
𝜋𝑠𝑏∗

where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠 , 𝐾2 = 3𝑡 + 𝐾1 , and 𝐾3 = 3𝑡 − 𝐾1.
Proof：All proofs are included in Appendix A.

□

Some observations related to the equilibrium are worth attention. First, when does the salvage
of used product j for enterprise j, 𝑏𝑗𝑗 , influence the enterprises’ sales and profits? It’s more difficult
for an enterprise that has a lower market share in the last cycle to grab the market or maintain the
market share. When the market share of enterprise i is 0.75 in the last cycle, 𝛼 = 0.75, enterprise
s needs more advanced remanufacturing technology to keep the salvage of used product s for
enterprise s three times of that of i, 𝑏𝑠𝑠 = 3𝑏𝑖𝑖 . On the contrary, enterprise i, which had a larger
market share in the last cycle, can easily grab the market.
𝑏∗
Second, the lower salvage 𝑏𝑗𝑗 , the smaller total discount 𝑣𝑗𝑗
. It is rational that enterprises

collect used products of lower salvage to reduce the total discount. The total discount is about 1⁄3
of the salvage, and especially, when 𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑠𝑠 , the total discount is exactly 1⁄3 of the salvage,
𝑏∗
𝑣𝑗𝑗
= 1⁄3 𝑏𝑗𝑗 .

Third, consumers get 2⁄3 of salvage value. Compared with model a, consumers get the total
13

trade-in discount and lower price for the new product in Case 1. The whole difference value is
exact 2⁄3 of the salvage value, and the enterprise get the rest 1⁄3. The utility of the used product
is almost none to consumers, but valuable to enterprises. Both consumers and enterprises benefit
from trade-in transactions.
4.2 Case 2
In Case 2, both enterprises adopt the flexible trade-in strategy. Market segments remain, but
consumers can purchase any products through trade-in, as shown in Figure 4. Compared to Case
1, some utility functions change. In segment 1, the utility consumers derived from purchasing
products of enterprise s can be reformulated as
𝑈𝑠 = 𝑢𝑠 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑃𝑠 + 𝑣𝑠𝑖 .

(10)

In segment 2, the utility consumers derived from purchasing products of enterprise i can be
reformulated as
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑠 .

(11)

By letting 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑠 in both market segments, indifferent consumer’s locations in two market
segments can be defined as 𝑥1𝑑 =

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑖 −𝑣𝑠𝑖 )
2𝑡

and 𝑥2𝑑 =

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑠 −𝑣𝑠𝑠 )
2𝑡

. In

market segment 1, consumers whose mismatch with enterprise i is smaller than that of indifferent
consumers in segment 1 will choose enterprise i, and the rest consumers will choose enterprise s.
In market segment 2, the situation is similar.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
In Case 2, two enterprises still pursue maximal profit. Considering the total discount and the
changed sales, the enterprises’ profit function can be reformulated as
𝜋𝑖𝑑 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )𝛼𝑥1𝑑 + (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 )(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2𝑑 ,

(12)

𝜋𝑠𝑑 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 )𝛼(1 − 𝑥1𝑑 ) + (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2𝑑 ).

(13)

Solving the first order conditions for the two profit-maximizing enterprise yields the
equilibrium prices, total discount, profits, and sales, as summarized by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. When both enterprises take a flexible trade-in strategy, the equilibrium prices are
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𝑑∗
3𝑣𝑠𝑖
+ 𝐾3 − 2𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖
,
3
𝑑∗
3𝑣𝑖𝑠
+ 𝐾2 − 2𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠
= 𝐶𝑖 +
,
3

𝑃𝑠𝑑∗ = 𝐶𝑠 +
𝑃𝑖𝑑∗
the equilibrium sales are
𝑞𝑖𝑑∗ =

𝐾2 + 𝛼(𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 ) − (1 − 𝛼)(𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠 )
,
6𝑡
𝑞𝑠𝑑∗ = 1 − 𝑞𝑖𝑑∗ ,

the equilibrium total trade-in discounts are
𝑑∗
3𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑑∗ − 3𝑣𝑖𝑠
= 2𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 2𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 ,
𝑑∗
𝑑∗
3𝑣𝑠𝑖
− 3𝑣𝑠𝑠
= 2𝑏𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 2𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠 ,

and the equilibrium profits are
𝛼(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 )2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )2
,
18𝑡
𝛼(𝐾3 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾3 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠 )2
=
,
18𝑡

𝜋𝑖𝑑∗ =
𝜋𝑠𝑑∗

where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠 , 𝐾2 = 3𝑡 + 𝐾1 , and 𝐾3 = 3𝑡 − 𝐾1.
Some observations related to the equilibrium are worth attention. First, the greater the gap in
remanufacturing technology between the two enterprises, the easier it is for the leading enterprises
to seize the market. As 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 increase, the technology gap wider, sales of
enterprise i increase and sales of s decrease when market share in the last cycle, 𝛼, is constant.
For the illustrative purpose, Figure 5 shows an example. When 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 are
close to −0.3, the difference between sales of i and s is getting lager. Meanwhile, when 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖
and 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 are close to 0.3 , the difference disappeared first, then became negative. The
remanufacturing technology advantage eliminates the gap in market share.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
4.3 Case 3
In Case 3, enterprise i switches to the flexible trade-in strategy, while enterprise s sticks to
the simple one. Consumers in market segment 2, where they own the used products of enterprise
s, can purchase any products through trade-in. But consumers in the market segment 1 has the
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trade-in option only for enterprise i’s products rather than enterprise s’ products. And Figure 6
shows the Hotelling lines in two market segments.
Compared to Case 1, some utility functions change. In segment 2, the utility consumers
derived from purchasing products of enterprise i can be reformulated as
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑠 .

(14)

By letting 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑠 in both segments, indifferent consumer’s locations in two segments can
be defined as 𝑥1𝑐 =

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑖 −𝑣𝑠𝑖 )
2𝑡

and 𝑥2𝑐 =

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡−𝑣𝑠𝑠
2𝑡

. In market segment 1,

consumers whose mismatch with enterprise i is smaller than that of indifferent consumers in
segment 1 choose enterprise i, and the rest choose enterprise s. In market segment 2, the situation
is similar.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
In Case 3, two enterprises still pursue maximal profit. Considering the total discount and the
changed sales, the enterprises’ profit function can be reformulated as
𝜋𝑖𝑐 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )𝛼𝑥1𝑐

𝑐1

+ (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 )(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2𝑐 ,

(15)

𝜋𝑠𝑐 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 )𝛼(1 − 𝑥1𝑐 ) + (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2𝑐 ).

(16)

Solving the first order conditions for the two profit-maximizing enterprise yields the
equilibrium prices, total discount, profits, and sales, as summarized by Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. When both enterprise i take flexible trade-in strategy, and enterprise s simple, the
equilibrium prices are
𝑃𝑠𝑐∗ = 𝐶𝑠 +

𝐾3 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖
,
3

𝑃𝑖𝑐∗ = 2𝑃𝑠𝑐∗ + 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑆 − 𝑡 − 𝐶𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑐∗ ,
the equilibrium sales are
𝑞𝑖𝑐∗ =

𝐾2 + 𝛼𝑏𝑖𝑖 − (1 − 𝛼)(𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠 )
,
6𝑡
𝑞𝑠𝑐∗ = 1 − 𝑞𝑖𝑐∗ ,

the equilibrium total trade-in discounts are
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𝑐∗
𝑣𝑠𝑠
=

2𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠
,
3

𝑐∗
𝑐∗
𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑐∗ − 𝑣𝑖𝑠
= 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 2𝑣𝑠𝑠
,

and the equilibrium profits are
𝜋𝑖𝑐∗
𝜋𝑠𝑐∗

𝛼(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )2
=
,
18𝑡
𝛼(𝐾3 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾3 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠 )2
=
,
18𝑡

where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠 , 𝐾2 = 3𝑡 + 𝐾1 , and 𝐾3 = 3𝑡 − 𝐾1.
Combined with Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, it can be found that 𝑞𝑠𝑏∗ > 𝑞𝑠𝑐∗ < 𝑞𝑠𝑑∗ and 𝜋𝑠𝑏∗ > 𝜋𝑠𝑐∗ <
𝜋𝑠𝑑∗ . Whether considering market share or corporate profits, Case 3 is always the worst-case
scenario for enterprise s. When the enterprise i adopts the flexible trade-in strategy, the best choice
of the enterprise s is also the flexible trade-in strategy, corresponding to Case 2. In the smartphone
industry, as an example, when Apple moved from the simple trade-in strategy to the flexible, the
other enterprises had to take the same action, or they would suffer the loss of market share and
profit.

5. Simple versus Flexible
Which trade-in strategy do enterprises prefer? Is the better performance strategy a greener
one? To get the answer, the equilibria in the two cases are compared, and their environmental
performance is also assessed.
When one enterprise adopts trade-in strategies, first simple and then flexible, the other is
likely to do the same due to marketing and financial pressures (see Appendix B for more
information). The more interesting question is: in which situation is an enterprise likely to switch
from the simple trade-in strategy to the flexible strategy? The answer to this question is rooted in
enterprise profit and sales changes between Case 1 and Case 2. Accordingly, comparing the
equilibrium sales of two cases summarized in Lemmas 1 and 2 yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If (1 − 𝛼)𝑏𝑖𝑠 > 𝛼𝑏𝑠𝑖 , the sales of enterprise i increase more in Case 2 than in Case
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1, while those of enterprise s decrease.
The illustration of Proposition 1, as shown in Fig.7 provides additional insights. For sales,
enterprise i wants to keep the simple-simple situation (Case 1) when it has a high market share (𝛼),
but prefers the flexible-flexible situation (Case 2) otherwise. In addition to market share,
remanufacturing capability matters as well. When enterprise i has an advantage in remanufacturing
(the salvage 𝑏𝑖𝑠 is bigger than 𝑏𝑠𝑖 ), it has more incentive to switch to flexible-flexible situation.
For an enterprise that has a high market share, even a bigger remanufacturing effort (e.g.,
technology investment) is needed for flexible trade-in to sustain the same level of sales.
[Insert Figure 7 here]
To better understand Proposition 1, the sales of two enterprises in two market segments are
analyzed across two cases. In the two cases, the market is segmented as shown in Figure 8. When
owners of enterprise j’s products buy its competitor's new products, they are no longer loyal
customers. In the last cycle, all consumers in segment 1, 𝛼, buy the products of enterprise i, but
in this cycle, some of them “betray” in both Case 1 and 2. While such betrayals exist all the time
in either segment, their numbers depend on indifferent consumers’ locations. For example, the
percentage of betrayals in segment 1 of Case 1 is equal to 1 minus 𝑥1𝑏 , the indifferent consumer’s
location. The number of betrayals in segment 1 of Case 1 is equal to this percentage multiplied by
the size of segment 1, 𝛼. The indifferent consumer’s location is the key to the number of betrayals.
In segment 1, the more it positions to the left, the bigger number of betrayals, and the opposite
holds for segment 2. Four indifferent consumer’s locations are marked in figure 8. It can be
observed that 𝑥1𝑑 is to the left of 𝑥1𝑏 and 𝑥2𝑏 is to the left of 𝑥2𝑑 , which means more betrayals in
Case 2 than in Case 1 in both segments.
[Insert Figure 8 here]
Table 4 lists the indifferent consumer’s locations in two market segments, and the difference
reaches the same conclusion numerically. We know the difference of ratio of betrayal between
Case 1 and 2, and the key factors making the difference are 𝑏𝑠𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖𝑠 . The higher the 𝑏𝑠𝑖 or
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𝑏𝑖𝑠 , the higher the ratio of betrayal in segment 1 or 2. It is interesting that improving the salvage
value of used products made by competitors in remanufacturing can induce the betrayal of regular
consumers of competitors. This provides an impetus for enterprises to improve remanufacturing
technology. The salvages, 𝑏𝑠𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖𝑠 , and the sizes of market segments influence the sales of
enterprises in the way of proposition 1.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Proposition 2. If 𝛼[𝑏𝑠𝑖 2 − 2(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )𝑏𝑠𝑖 ] > (𝛼 − 1)[𝑏𝑖𝑠 2 + 2(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )𝑏𝑖𝑠 ], where 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 +
3𝑡, the profits of enterprise i increase more in Case 2 than Case 1, while those of enterprise s
decrease.
Fig.9 illustrates Proposition 2 from the perspective of profitability. The insights obtained were
similar to those based on the illustration of Proposition 1 from the perspective of sales. Enterprise
i prefers the simple-simple situation (Case 1) when market share (𝛼) is high, but the flexibleflexible situation (Case 2) when 𝛼 is low. An advantage in remanufacturing (the salvage ratio
increase) will make the flexible-flexible situation more attractive. An enterprise enjoying a high
market share, however, is reluctant to make the switch due to the additional efforts required by
flexible trade-in that may hurt its profitability.
[Insert Figure 9 here]
From the government perspective in terms of environment protection, Case 1 and Case 2 are
further compared through the assessment of carbon emission for manufacturing new or
remanufactured products. The carbon emission of making each new product is denoted as 𝑒𝑖𝑛 or
𝑒𝑠𝑛 , and each remanufactured product 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 , 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 , 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 or 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 . For instance, the carbon emission
of enterprise i making a remanufactured product with a used product made by enterprise s is
denoted as 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 .
To assess the environmental performance for Case 1, this study obtains the total emission of
two enterprises with the following function:
𝐶𝐸 𝑏 = 𝑒𝑖𝑛 (1 − 𝛼)𝑥2𝑏 + 𝑒𝑠𝑛 𝛼(1 − 𝑥1𝑏 ) + 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 𝛼𝑥1𝑏 + 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2𝑏 ).
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(17)

For Case 2:
𝐶𝐸 𝑑 = 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 (1 − 𝛼)𝑥2𝑑 + 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 𝛼(1 − 𝑥1𝑑 ) + 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 𝛼𝑥1𝑑 + 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2𝑑 ).
Proposition

3.

If

(18)

𝛼[(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )𝑏𝑠𝑖 + (𝑒𝑠𝑛 − 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 )(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )] + (1 − 𝛼)[(𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 )𝑏𝑖𝑠 −

(𝑒𝑖𝑛 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )] > 0, where 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡, the total carbon emission is more in Case 2
than in Case 1, 𝐶𝐸 𝑑 > 𝐶𝐸 𝑏 .
As shown in Proposition 3, the flexible-flexible situation yields more carbon emission than
the simple-simple one. For sales and profits, enterprises may switch from the simple trade-in
strategy to the flexible one at the cost of the environment. In order to reinforce the fulfillment of
corporate social responsibility, the government may resort to the carbon tax mechanism, as
discussed in the next section.
In Case 2, all consumers choose to participate in trade-in. With more used products recycled,
how can there more carbon emission than in Case 1? Not just the carbon emission of the
manufacturing unit new product is more than that of remanufacturing, 𝑒𝑗𝑛 > 𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑟 , where 𝑗 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑠}
and 𝑘 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑠}, but also the carbon emission of enterprise j remanufacturing with used products
made by k is more than that of enterprise k, 𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑟 >𝑒𝑘𝑘𝑟 . In addition, the sales of each enterprise in
two market segments differ in Case 1 and Case 2. Two examples are given below to illustrate the
paradox.
As shown in Figure 10, when 𝑏𝑖𝑠 and 𝑏𝑠𝑖 are small enough, carbon emission in Case 1 is
more than that in Case 2; as they increase, the carbon emission in Case 2 gradually exceeds that in
Case 1. The parameters set as 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 = 0.2 , 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 0.15 , 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 = 0.34 and 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25 , which
mean the carbon emission of enterprise j remanufacturing with its own used products is less than
that of it remanufacturing with its competitor’s, or 𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑟 < 𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑟 . In addition, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25 and
𝑒𝑖𝑛 = 0.4, which mean carbon emission of j manufacturing a new product is more than that of k
remanufacturing with a used product made by j, or 𝑒𝑘𝑗𝑟 < 𝑒𝑗𝑛 . When 𝑏𝑗𝑘 increases, the ratio of
betrayal increases in both segments, as more consumers trade in the used products made by j to its
competitor for new ones.
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[Insert Figure 10 here]
Similarly, Figure 11 shows that when 𝑏𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑠𝑠 is small enough, carbon emission in Case
1 is more than that in Case 2. As 𝑏𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑠𝑠 increase, the carbon emission in Case 2 gradually
exceeds that in Case 1.
[Insert Figure 11 here]
As shown in Figure 12, the carbon emission caused by consumers located between 𝑥1𝑑∗ and
𝑥1𝑑 in segment 1 increases, and that caused by consumers located between 𝑥1𝑑 and 1 decreases.
This makes it possible for the carbon emission in Case 2 to be larger than that in Case 1. When
𝑏𝑗𝑘 is big enough, the carbon emission of Case 2 is equal to that in Case 1.
[Insert Figure 12 here]
The above analysis confirms that Case 2 may produce more emission in total. The next section
will address how to mitigate the negative impact by employing the carbon tax policy.

6. Carbon Tax Policies
For the purpose of emission reduction, it is a common practice for the government to levy
carbon tax. When the taxation policy is introduced, will flexible trade-in strategy still be attractive
to enterprises? In this section, basic carbon tax is denoted as c and preferential carbon tax denoted
as 𝜌𝑐. The preferential carbon tax is designed for remanufactured products, which are more
environment-friendly due to lower unit emission.
First, Case CT (Carbon Tax) is established in which basic carbon tax is levied on all products.
Case CT is solved in a way similar to Case 2 in Lemma 2. As the two enterprises need to pay
carbon tax for their products, the profits function can be reformulated as:
𝜋𝑖𝐶𝑇 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )𝛼𝑥1𝐶𝑇

(19)

+(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2𝐶𝑇 ,
𝜋𝑠𝐶𝑇 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 )𝛼(1 − 𝑥1𝐶𝑇 )
+(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 )(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2𝐶𝑇 ).
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(20)

Second, Case DCT (Differentiated Carbon Tax) is established to accommodate preferential
carbon tax for environment-friendly products. In this case, preferential carbon tax applies when
enterprise j engages in remanufacturing with used products made by itself. The profits function
can be reformulated as:
𝜋𝑖𝐷𝐶𝑇 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )𝛼𝑥1𝐷𝐶𝑇

(21)

+(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2𝐷𝐶𝑇 ,
𝜋𝑠𝐷𝐶𝑇 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 )𝛼(1 − 𝑥1𝐷𝐶𝑇 )

(22)

+(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 )(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2𝐷𝐶𝑇 ).
Proposition 4. Carbon emission in Case CT is lower than that in Case 2 all time; if 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 < 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟
and 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 < 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 , carbon emission in Case DCT is lower than that in Case CT. Carbon tax policy is
effective in controlling greenhouse gas emission.
The carbon tax policy urges enterprises to produce more environment-friendly products,
lowering the total carbon emission. An example is given in Figure 13: when carbon tax rate
increases, total carbon emission in both Case CT and Case DCT decreases, while the latter
outperforms the former. Therefore, the preferential carbon tax policy favoring environmentfriendly products is more effective than the basic one.
[Insert Figure 13 here]
Proposition 5. Carbon tax policy does not always mean a loss of profits. If 𝛼[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )2 +
2(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 )] + (1 − 𝛼)[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )2 + 2(𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )] > 0 ,
where 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡 , the profit of enterprise i is higher in Case CT than in Case 2;
if

𝛼[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝜌𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )2 + 2(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝜌𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 )] + (1 − 𝛼)[𝑐(𝜌𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )2 +

2(𝜌𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )] > 0, where 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡, the profit of enterprise i is higher in
Case DCT than in Case 2.
When carbon tax is levied, it may have a positive impact on an enterprise’s profitability. As
shown in Figure 14, when carbon tax rate c increases within the low range (below 0.4-0.5), the
profit of enterprise i decreases. When it continues rising in the high range, however, the profit of
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enterprise i increases in both Case Tax and Case DCT. Beyond the carbon tax rate of around 0.8,
the profit of enterprise i is even higher in Case DCT than in Case 2. Thus, a strong preferential
carbon tax policy is conducive to the healthy development of the remanufacturing industry.
[Insert Figure 14 here]

7. Conclusion
The purpose of the trade-in is to protect the environment by recycling used products for
remanufacturing. In order to meet the needs of consumers, many enterprises have adopted the
flexible trade-in strategy to replace the simple one, but such a practice may compromise the
environment protection purpose. This study focuses on enterprise choice between simple and
flexible trade-in strategies in terms of their business and environment impacts considering carbon
tax mechanism. The findings suggest that remanufacturing based on simple trade-in is optimal for
both environment and business. Flexible trade-in is more of a marketing strategy that attracts
consumers from competitors but increases total emission.
The findings yield some helpful implications for managers and policy-makers:
a. Being the first enterprise to implement a trade-in program (simple or flexible) helps
capture more market share. The other enterprises are better off to follow suit, or lose their
edge. In reality, it is recommended that an enterprise adopt the same trade-in strategy as
its competitor’s.
b. Whether an enterprise shall be the first one to take a simple or flexible trade-in strategy
depends on certain conditions. An enterprise having a relatively large market share wants
to be the first to offer consumers the simple trade-in opportunity, and an enterprise having
relatively small market share wants to make the flexible trade-in option available. An
advantage in remanufacturing technology also motivates an enterprise to adopt the flexible
trade-in strategy.
c. The flexible trade-in strategy is less effective in cutting down carbon emission than the
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simple trade-in strategy. The carbon tax mechanism helps enterprises fulfill their corporate
social responsibility by making an environment-sensible choice between simple and
flexible trade-in strategies.
The trade-in activity is designed for environment protection by reducing pollution in the
manufacturing process. The flexible trade-in strategy provides consumers with more flexibility,
but it may not be more environmentally friendly than the simple one. It is necessary for the
government to implement environmental policies, such as carbon tax, to guide enterprises to
choose greener strategies.
Enterprises must use the flexible trade-in strategy with caution. It is true that one enterprise
may get more profit by taking the flexible trade-in strategy when competitors are taking the simple
one. But profit will diminish when competitors switch to the flexible one as well. Actually, the
profit may be lower than the previous phase when enterprises all take the simple trade-in strategy.
It is up to the government to avoid the damage to both the environment and industry by
discouraging enterprises from using flexible trade-in strategy.
This study has limitations that point to future research. The single-cycle models established
are simpler but not very realistic, and they can be extended to multiple-cycle ones in the future.
Also, a marketplace for used product exchange is likely to improve the utilization rate of used
products. Further analyses may consider the possibility that enterprises trade used products with
each other. Finally, cap-and-trade policy can be included to compare with carbon tax in terms of
similar or different roles that they play in corporate choice of trade-in strategies.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. As 𝑞𝑖𝑏 =

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+α𝑣𝑖𝑖 −(1−𝛼)𝑣𝑠𝑠
2𝑡

, we can rewrite the two profit functions

as
𝜋𝑖𝑏 =

(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
+(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 )

𝜋𝑠𝑏

(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 ) [1 −

=

2𝑡

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡−𝑣𝑠𝑠

2𝑡
𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖
2𝑡

+(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 ) [1 −
Using the first-order conditions,

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖

∂𝜋𝑖𝑏
∂𝑣𝑖𝑖

∂𝜋𝑖𝑏

= 0,

∂𝑃𝑖

(1 − 𝛼)

2𝑡

𝑃𝑖𝑏 = 𝐶𝑖 +

𝐾2 −𝑏𝑠𝑠

𝑃𝑠𝑏 = 𝐶𝑠 +

𝐾3 −𝑏𝑖𝑖

3

3

𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑏 =

2𝑏𝑖𝑖 −𝑏𝑠𝑠

𝑏
𝑣𝑠𝑠
=

2𝑏𝑠𝑠 −𝑏𝑖𝑖

3

(A.1)

]α

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡−𝑣𝑠𝑠

= 0,

α
,

∂𝜋𝑠𝑏
∂𝑣𝑠𝑠

] (1 − 𝛼)
∂𝜋𝑠𝑏

= 0 and

∂𝑃𝑠

.

(A.2)

= 0, we have

,

(A.3)

,

(A.4)

,

3

(A.5)

.

(A.6)

The second-order conditions are negative in both cases. The four equations above yield the
𝑏∗
equilibrium prices of 𝑃𝑖𝑏∗ , 𝑃𝑠𝑏∗ , 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑏∗ and 𝑣𝑠𝑠
in Lemma 1. We can then drive the equilibrium

𝑞𝑖𝑏∗ , 𝑞𝑠𝑏∗ , 𝜋𝑖𝑏∗ and 𝜋𝑠𝑏∗ using the equilibrium prices.
Proof of Lemma 2. As 𝑞𝑖𝑑 =

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+α(𝑣𝑖𝑖 −𝑣𝑠𝑖 )+(1−𝛼)(𝑣𝑖𝑠 −𝑣𝑠𝑠 )

, we can rewrite the two profit

2𝑡

functions as
𝜋𝑖𝑑 =

(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖 −𝑣𝑠𝑖

+(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 )
𝜋𝑠𝑑 =

(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 ) [1 −

2𝑡
𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖 −𝑣𝑠𝑖

+(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 ) [1 −
∂𝜋𝑖𝑑

Using the first-order conditions,

∂𝑣𝑖𝑖

= 0,

∂𝜋𝑖𝑑

𝑃𝑠𝑑∗ = 𝐶𝑠 +

α

2𝑡
𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑠 −𝑣𝑠𝑠 )

∂𝑃𝑖

2𝑡

= 0,

∂𝜋𝑠𝑑
∂𝑣𝑠𝑠

= 0 and

3

,

,

]α

2𝑡
𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑠 −𝑣𝑠𝑠 )

𝑑∗
3𝑣𝑠𝑖
+𝐾3 −2𝑏𝑠𝑖 −𝑏𝑖𝑖
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(1 − 𝛼)

∂𝜋𝑠𝑑
∂𝑃𝑠

] (1 − 𝛼)

(A.7)

.

(A.8)

= 0, we have
(A.9)

𝑃𝑖𝑑∗ = 𝐶𝑖 +

𝑑∗
3𝑣𝑖𝑠
+𝐾2 −2𝑏𝑖𝑠 −𝑏𝑠𝑠

3

,

(A.10)

𝑑∗
3𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑑∗ − 3𝑣𝑖𝑠
= 2𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 2𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 ,

(A.11)

𝑑∗
𝑑∗
3𝑣𝑠𝑖
− 3𝑣𝑠𝑠
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(A.12)

And the second-order conditions are negative in both cases. Then the four equations above
𝑑∗
yield the equilibrium prices of 𝑃𝑖𝑑∗ , 𝑃𝑠𝑑∗ , 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑑∗ and 𝑣𝑠𝑠
in Lemma 2. We can then drive the

equilibrium 𝑞𝑖𝑑∗ , 𝑞𝑠𝑑∗ , 𝜋𝑖𝑑∗ and 𝜋𝑠𝑑∗ using the equilibrium prices.
Proof of Lemma 3. As 𝑞𝑖𝑐 =
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functions as
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𝑃𝑠𝑐∗ = 𝐶𝑠 +

𝐾3 −𝑏𝑖𝑖
3

,

]α

𝑢𝑖 −𝑢𝑠 −(𝑃𝑖 −𝑃𝑠 )+𝑡−𝑣𝑠𝑠

= 0, ∂𝑃 = 0,

(1 − 𝛼)

= 0 and

] (1 − 𝛼)

∂𝜋𝑠𝑐
∂𝑃𝑠

(A.13)

.

(A.14)

= 0, we have

,

(A.15)

𝑃𝑖𝑐∗ = 2𝑃𝑠𝑐∗ + 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑆 − 𝑡 − 𝐶𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑐∗ ,
𝑐∗
𝑣𝑠𝑠
=

2𝑏𝑠𝑠 −𝑏𝑖𝑖 +𝑏𝑖𝑠
3

(A.16)

,

(A.17)

𝑐∗
𝑐∗
𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑐∗ − 𝑣𝑖𝑠
= 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 2𝑣𝑠𝑠
.

(A.18)

And the second-order conditions are negative in both cases. Then the four equations above
𝑐∗
yield the equilibrium prices of 𝑃𝑖𝑐∗ , 𝑃𝑠𝑐∗ , 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑐∗ and 𝑣𝑠𝑠
Lemma 3. We can then drive the

equilibrium 𝑞𝑖𝑐∗ , 𝑞𝑠𝑐∗ , 𝜋𝑖𝑐∗ and 𝜋𝑠𝑐∗ using the equilibrium prices.
Proof of Proposition 1. Because
−𝛼𝑏𝑖𝑖 +(1−𝛼)𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡

𝑞𝑖𝑑∗ =

𝐾2

−
6𝑡

−𝛼(𝑏𝑖𝑖 −𝑏𝑠𝑖 )+(1−𝛼)(𝑏𝑠𝑠 −𝑏𝑖𝑠 )
6𝑡

and

𝑞𝑖𝑏∗ =

𝐾2
6t

−

, 𝑞𝑖𝑑∗ > 𝑞𝑖𝑏∗ if and only if −𝛼𝑏𝑠𝑖 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏𝑖𝑠 > 0. The same reason applies to

manufacture s.
Proof

of

Proposition

2.

Because

𝜋𝑖𝑏∗ =
29

𝛼(𝐾2 +𝑏𝑖𝑖 )2 +(1−𝛼)(𝐾2 −𝑏𝑠𝑠 )2
18𝑡

and

𝜋𝑖𝑑∗ =

𝛼(𝐾2 +𝑏𝑖𝑖 −𝑏𝑠𝑖 )2 +(1−𝛼)(𝐾2 +𝑏𝑖𝑠 −𝑏𝑠𝑠 )2
18𝑡

, 𝜋𝑖𝑑∗ > 𝜋𝑖𝑏∗ if and only if 𝛼[𝑏𝑠𝑖 2 − 2(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )𝑏𝑠𝑖 ] + (1 −

𝛼)[𝑏𝑖𝑠 2 + 2(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )𝑏𝑖𝑠 ] > 0, where 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡. The same reason applies to manufacture s.
Proof of Proposition 3. Because CE 𝑏∗ = 𝑒𝑖𝑛
𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟
𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟

𝐾3 +𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡

(1 − 𝛼)

𝐾3 −𝑏𝑖𝑠 +𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡

and

CE 𝑑∗ = 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟

𝐾2 +𝑏𝑖𝑠 −𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡

𝐾2 −𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡

(1 − 𝛼) + 𝑒𝑠𝑛

𝐾3 −𝑏𝑖𝑖
6𝑡

𝐾3 +𝑏𝑠𝑖 −𝑏𝑖𝑖

(1 − 𝛼) + 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟

6𝑡

α + 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟

α + 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟

𝐾2 +𝑏𝑖𝑖
6𝑡

𝐾2 +𝑏𝑖𝑖 −𝑏𝑠𝑖
6𝑡

α+
α+

(1 − 𝛼) , CE 𝑑∗ > CE 𝑏∗ if and only if α[(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )𝑏𝑠𝑖 + (𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑠𝑛 )(𝐾3 −

𝑏𝑖𝑖 )] + (1 − 𝛼)[(𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 )𝑏𝑖𝑠 + (𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑛 )(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )] > 0 , where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠 ,
𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡 and 𝐾3 = 3𝑡 − 𝐾1 .
Proof
𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟

of

Proposition

𝐾2 +𝑏𝑖𝑖 −𝑏𝑠𝑖
6𝑡

𝛼 + 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟

6𝑡

6𝑡

+

𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 (𝐾2 −𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 +𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 +𝑏𝑖𝑠 −𝑏𝑠𝑠 )(1−𝛼)
6𝑡

6𝑡

𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 (𝐾2 −𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 +𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 +𝑏𝑖𝑠 −𝑏𝑠𝑠 )(1−𝛼)

+

+

6𝑡

(1 − 𝛼) + 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟

𝐶𝐸 𝐶𝑇∗ =

,

(1 − 𝛼)

𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 (𝐾2 −𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 +𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 +𝑏𝑖𝑖 −𝑏𝑠𝑖 )𝛼

6𝑡

𝐾2 +𝑏𝑖𝑠 −𝑏𝑠𝑠

𝐶𝐸 𝑑∗ = 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟

Because

𝐾3 −𝑏𝑖𝑠 +𝑏𝑠𝑠

𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 (𝐾3 −𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 +𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 −𝑏𝑖𝑖 +𝑏𝑠𝑖 )𝛼

𝐶𝐸 𝐷𝐶𝑇∗ =

4.

+

𝐾3 +𝑏𝑠𝑖 −𝑏𝑖𝑖

𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 (𝐾2 −𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 +𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 +𝑏𝑖𝑖 −𝑏𝑠𝑖 )𝛼
6𝑡

𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 (𝐾3 −𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 +𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 +𝑏𝑠𝑠 −𝑏𝑖𝑠 )(1−𝛼)
6𝑡

𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 (𝐾3 −𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 +𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 −𝑏𝑖𝑖 +𝑏𝑠𝑖 )𝛼
6𝑡

𝛼+

6𝑡

+

and

+

𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 (𝐾3 −𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 +𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 +𝑏𝑠𝑠 −𝑏𝑖𝑠 )(1−𝛼)
6𝑡

.

CE 𝐶𝑇∗ − CE 𝑑∗ is equivalent to −𝛼(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )2 < (1 − 𝛼)(𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 − 𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 )2 , and CE 𝐶𝑇∗ <
CE 𝑑∗ , where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠 and 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡.
CE 𝐷𝐶𝑇∗ < CE 𝐶𝑇∗ if and only if 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 < 0 and 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 < 0.
1

Proof of proposition5. Because 𝜋𝑖𝑑∗ = 18𝑡 [𝛼(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑆𝑖 )2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑆 − 𝑏𝑆𝑆 )2 ] ,
1

𝜋𝑖𝐶𝑇∗ = 18𝑡 [𝛼(𝐾2 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑟 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑆𝑖 )2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑆𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑟 + 𝑏𝑖𝑆 − 𝑏𝑆𝑆 )2 ]
and

1

𝜋𝑖𝐷𝐶𝑇∗ = 18𝑡 [𝛼(𝐾2 − 𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑟 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑆𝑖 )2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑆𝑟 + 𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑟 + 𝑏𝑖𝑆 −

𝑏𝑆𝑆 )2 ]. Where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠 and 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡.
𝜋𝑖𝑑∗ < 𝜋𝑖𝐶𝑇∗

if and only if 𝛼[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )2 + 2(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 )] + (1 −

𝛼)[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )2 + 2(𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )] > 0.
𝜋𝑖𝑑∗ < 𝜋𝑖𝐷𝐶𝑇∗ if and only if 𝛼[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝜌𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )2 + 2(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝜌𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 )(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 )] + (1 −
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𝛼)[𝑐(𝜌𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )2 + 2(𝜌𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 )(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 )] > 0.

Appendix B
This appendix illustrates why enterprise s takes the same simple trade-in strategy as enterprise
i had taken, by comparing Combination b and Combination e in terms of enterprise profit.
Combination e where enterprise i takes simple trade-in strategy and enterprise s takes none tradein strategy is modeled, with consumer utility function in Eq. (1), Eq. (2) and Eq. (6), and enterprise
profit function in Eq. (5) and Eq. (8). Solving the first-order conditions for the two profitmaximizing enterprises yields the equilibrium profit:
𝜋𝑠𝑒∗

=

𝑏
𝛼(𝐾3 −2𝑏𝑖𝑖 )(𝐾3 − 𝑖𝑖 )+(1−𝛼)(𝐾3 −2𝑏𝑖𝑖 )(𝐾3 +𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
2

18𝑡

.

(B.1)

Based on the equilibrium profits of enterprise s in Combination b (as shown in Lemma 1) and
Combination e (as shown in Eq. B.1), there is:
𝜋𝑠𝑏∗

−

𝜋𝑠𝑒∗

=

𝑏
𝛼 𝑖𝑖 𝐾3 +(1−𝛼)(2𝑏𝑖𝑖 2 +𝑏𝑠𝑠 2 +𝐾3 (2𝑏𝑠𝑠 +𝑏𝑖𝑖 ))
2

18𝑡

> 0.

(B.2)

Enterprise s gets more profit in Combination b than Combination e, and enterprise s will take
the same simple trade-in strategy as enterprise i has taken. Similarly, it can be verified that
enterprise s will take the same flexible trade-in strategy as enterprise i has taken.
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Figure Captions
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strategy choice
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Figure 9. The impact of market segment size and salvage difference on enterprises’ trade-in
strategy choice
Figure 10. Carbons emission with different salvage 𝑏𝑗𝑘
Figure 11. Carbons emission with different salvage 𝑏𝑗𝑗
Figure 12. The carbon emission caused by consumers in Case 2
Figure 13. Total carbon emission with different carbon tax rate c
Figure 14. Profit of enterprise i with different carbon tax rate c
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Figure 1. Consumers’ buying options and the responding utilities

Figure 2. Hotelling line of model-a

Figure 3. Hotelling lines in Case 1

Figure 4. Hotelling lines in Case 2
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Note: In this example, we set 𝐶𝑖 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑢𝑖 = 0.4, 𝑢𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.7
Figure 5. Sales of two enterprises with the different remanufacturing technology gap

Figure 6. Hotelling lines in Case 3
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Figure 7. The impact of market segment size and salvage difference on enterprises’ trade-in
strategy choice (with ratio 𝑏𝑖𝑠 ⁄𝑏𝑠𝑖 ).

Figure 8. The segment of the market in two cases
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Figure 9. The impact of market segment size and salvage difference on enterprises’ trade-in
strategy choice (with ratio

𝑏𝑖𝑠 2 +2(𝐾2 −𝑏𝑠𝑠 )𝑏𝑖𝑠
).
𝑏𝑠𝑖 2 −2(𝐾2 +𝑏𝑖𝑖 )𝑏𝑠𝑖

Note: This example sets 𝐶𝑖 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑢𝑖 = 0.4, 𝑢𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.7, 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 =
0.2, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 0.15, 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 = 0.34, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑒𝑠𝑛 = 0.3, 𝑒𝑖𝑛 = 0.4, 𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 0.3, 𝑏𝑠𝑠 = 0.2
Figure 10. Carbons emission with different salvage 𝑏𝑗𝑘
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Note: This example sets 𝐶𝑖 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑢𝑖 = 0.4, 𝑢𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.7, 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 =
0.2, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 0.15, 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 = 0.34, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑒𝑠𝑛 = 0.3, 𝑒𝑖𝑛 = 0.4, 𝑏𝑖𝑠 = 0.1, 𝑏𝑠𝑖 = 0.15
Figure 11. Carbons emission with different salvage 𝑏𝑗𝑗

Figure 12. The carbon emission caused by consumers in Case 2
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Note: In this example, we set 𝐶𝑖 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑢𝑖 = 0.4, 𝑢𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.7,
𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 = 0.2, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 0.15, 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 = 0.34, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑏𝑖𝑠 = 0.1, 𝑏𝑠𝑖 = 0.15, 𝜌 = 0.7
Figure 13. Total carbon emission with different carbon tax rate c

Note: In this example, we set 𝐶𝑖 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑢𝑖 = 0.4, 𝑢𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.7,
𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 = 0.2, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 0.15, 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 = 0.34, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑏𝑖𝑠 = 0.1, 𝑏𝑠𝑖 = 0.15, 𝜌 = 0.7
Figure 14. Profit of enterprise i with different carbon tax rate c
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